Maturity mismatches (MMs) expose banks to interest rate risk and thus add to the uncertainty and ambiguity of the bank's performance. Given the significance of interest rate risk for banking operations, we study the relationship between MMs and investor disagreement, as proxied by trading volume in the banks' equity. We overcome infrequency and opacity of accounting disclosures, which interfere with direct measurements of MMs, by resorting to implied MMs, computed as stock return sensitivity to interest rate changes. We find that implied MMs are positively associated with trading volume, and that the role of returns in this relationship is minimal or null.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we explore the extent to which changes in bank exposure to interest risk, impacted by implied maturity mismatches (MMs), affect trading volumes, which indicate the dispersion of investors' beliefs.
1 MMs are of interest since they are a crucial factor in determining the vulnerability of banks' profits to interest rate changes, and since banks are central to the economy. Ideally, MMs could be measured directly from the banks' financial disclosures. But financial reports are subject to managerial discretion, e.g., managers are reluctant to disclose the detailed maturity of the assets and liabilities in their portfolio, which are necessary for the explicit computation of their interest risks (Morgan 2002 , Flannery et al. 2004 and Flannery et al. 2013 . Even if MMs are disclosed, the reported maturities are often different from the actual ones due to aggregation of reported items, prepayment and extension risks and the existence of items with ambiguous maturities such as saving and demand deposits. This makes maturity evaluation even more challenging (we expand on this issue in the next section). In view of the opaqueness of accounting data and the low frequency of their release, it becomes evident that the estimation of MMs based on financial reports cannot be precise.
Such flaws in measuring MMs from accounting data led us to infer MMs from the observed bank return sensitivities to interest rate changes. Based on such estimates, we extend the literature by exploring the effects of banks' (implied) MMs on the volume of trading. We find that monthly changes in MMs are positively correlated with increased trading, which, consistent with the extant literature, can serve as proxies to investors' disagreement about stock prices. 2 We document a positive relationship between implied MMs and stock trading volume on a sample of AMEX, NYSE and NASDAQ listed financial institutions in the 1 Beaver's (1968) seminal article, trading volume has been explored from the point of view of investor disagreement (see also Harris and Raviv 1993 , Gervais and Odean 2001 , Huberman and Regev 2001 , DellaVigna and Pollet 2009 . 2 See, e.g., Karpoff 1987 , Harris and Raviv 1993 , Blume et al.1994 , and Kim and Verrecchia 1994 post-decimalization era, spanning from January, 2000 to December 2012. 3 Our results appear robust to the several classes of interest rates and to alternative measures of disagreement. We further show that MMs influence volume beyond their indirect effects on trading, through their possible effects (if such effects are present) on prices.
The relationship between risk, prices and trading volume is important, because return reflects changes in the expectations of the market as a whole, and is not necessarily associated with trading, while trading reflects changes in the expectations of individual investors, and is not necessarily associated with price changes (Beaver 1968). The relations between individuals' expectations and those of the market may shed light on how the former are integrated into the latter. Following the
Our findings shed light on the functioning of capital markets, and may be useful to investors, analysts and regulators. If MMs cause investor disagreement and therefore induce costly trading, then the provision of additional information on MMs is beneficial and actions encouraging the dissemination of pertinent information about MMs that would reduce disagreement should be applauded.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature. Section 3 describes the data. In Section 4 the testable predictions are constructed, and the methodology and estimation procedures are explained. In Section 5 the results are presented and discussed, and Section 6 provides a number of conclusions.
MOTIVATION AND RELATED LITERATURE
We review the extant literature that directly relates to the issues of investor disagreement stemming from MMs, in three stages: Subsection 2.1 reviews related literature on MMs. In Subsection 2.2 we discuss the issues of the banks' opacity obscuring MM measurements, as well as stress the advantages of using interest rate sensitivities as implied MMs. Subsection 2.3 covers the relevant literature related to disagreement among investors and its correlation with trading volume.
MMs and interest rate risk
The extent of the literature on banks MMs does not match the importance of this topic. Past research investigating MMs mostly concentrates on risk management techniques in response to interest rate risk 3 Among other studies of the effects of several other types of information on disagreement we can find: Kandel and Pearson 1995 (earning announcements) , Lo and Wang 2000 (market beta) , Dzielinski and Hasseltoft 2014 (news flows) and Ferson and Lin 2014, (Jensen's alpha). exposure. Purnanandam (2007) finds that U.S. banks intensify hedging of on-balance sheet exposure with interest rate derivative contracts once their probability of default increases. Ruprecht et al. (2013) model the simultaneous choice of an on-balance duration gap and off-balance interest rate swap use of German banks.
They find that higher bankruptcy risk induces banks to reduce MM and increase the propensity to hedge this gap with interest rate swaps. Landier et al. (2013) study income gaps (the difference between interest rate sensitive loans and deposits). They report that, on average, banks tend to hold positive gaps, and the larger the gaps the more sensitive banks are to interest rate changes, despite the use of derivatives to hedge these risks. Similar conclusions were also reached by English et al. (2012) .
Deficiencies of estimating MMs from financial reports and the advantages of implied MMs
The above studies on MMs and risk suffer from very serious shortcomings, since they measure MMs based on balance sheet information. First, the maturities of many banks' assets and liabilities, such as cash holdings, saving accounts and demand deposits, are ill-defined and researchers do not fully agree on whether to classify these as long-term or short-term items.
Second, there is a considerable distinction between actual and stated maturity of items on the balance sheet. Data on the actual maturities of items are rarely available to bank outsiders due to non-mandatory disclosure of such information, but banks do take the data into account while building risk hedging strategies.
In financial literature, this dissimilarity between actual and stated maturities is known as prepayment or extension risk. As an example of prepayment risk, consider the case where the rate payable on a floating rate loan is expected to increase but the borrower may choose to prepay the entire loan earlier than expected.
When such a situation arises, the bank will experience a reduction in interest income. The opposite scenario is known as the extension risk.
Third, instruments with the same repricing dates may respond differently to changes in different interest rates (known as a basis risk). When an asset and a liability otherwise having the same repricing date are tied to different rates (say, Treasury bill and LIBOR), the fluctuation in underlying rates will create exposure of the bank to the spread between the rates. The stated maturities would ignore this nuance and give a researcher misleading information about the quality of balance sheet items.
Fourth, there is a problem of over-aggregation coupled with managerial reporting discretions that is allowed by regulators, such as the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and bank-specific regulations, together with managerial opportunism. These issues are nicely summarised by Saunders and Cornett (2008, p.203 ): "defining buckets over a range of maturities ignores information regarding the distribution of assets and liabilities within those buckets... On average, liabilities may be repriced toward the end of the bucket's range, while assets may be repriced toward the beginning, in which case a change in interest rates will have an effect on asset and liability cash flows that will not be accurately measured".
There are further interest rate risks that are not divulged in the banks reports, such as the risk of exposure stemming from extensive usage of complex derivatives (e.g., cross-currency swaps) and offbalance sheet items that are intangible contract obligations.
In light of the inadequacies of accounting data for measuring MMs, we suggest using implied MMs measured as return sensitivities to interest rate changes. We base this choice on the pioneering findings of Flannery and James (1984) , who documented a strong link between traditionally measured and implied MMs in the cross-section of U.S. traded banks. Extensive research has confirmed the conclusions of Flannery and James (1984) by expanding them to account for several types of interest rates, different time frames and different methodologies (see, e.g., Choi et al. 1992 , Song 1994 , Chamberlain et al. 1997 , and Schrand 1997 .
Investor disagreement and trading volume
Beaver's (1968) seminal article paved the way for studying the issue of dispersion in beliefs among shareholders and volume by documenting unusually high trading volume around earning announcement dates. The robustness of Beaver's (1968) finding was further established by a series of studies (e.g., Bamber
1987, Bamber and Cheon 1995 , Garfinkel and Sokobin 2006 , Garfinkel 2009 , D'Agusta et. al. 2015 . Kandel and Pearson (1995) documented a significant increase in trading activity around earning announcements even when event returns were close to zero, thus showing that it is disagreement rather than returns that affects the volume. Chae (2005) interpreted the observed patterns in trading before scheduled and unscheduled events from the perspective of strategic planning of informed and uninformed traders who act to minimize adverse selection costs. Carlin et al. (2014) pointed out that disagreement produces risk premium by increasing expected return, but periods of high disagreement are followed by periods of lower trading once investors learn from the observed patterns.
A large body of theoretical work builds upon the divergence of opinions among equity-holders and provides diverse motives for investor disagreement. 4 Harrison and Kreps (1978) suggest a model of speculative trading by heterogeneous investors anticipating time-varying information flow. The importance of noise traders was first established in the seminal paper of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) , who showed that no trading will occur in an environment with identical investors in the absence of noise traders. Kyle (1985) posits that information asymmetry increases trading because informed investors attempt to exploit their private information. Foster and Viswanathan (1996) build a model in which differentially informed traders attempt to predict the behaviour of each other, and where trading outcome is determined by the correlation structure of subjective signals.
Some of the literature studies the mechanisms of investor disagreement occurrence. According to the gradual information flow hypothesis, at any one time period traders share different information sets on bank risks, and therefore trading occurs as an outcome of continuous information disclosure to each group of traders (Huberman and Regev 2001 order to construct our implied MMs, and then run regressions to test the extent to which these MMs are correlated with volume.
Estimating the implied MMs
To compute the implied MMs, we use the Fama-French 3 factor model and add to it a sensitivity to interest rate factor, . We thus run regressions of the following form for each bank (dropping the bank's subscript i from the equation to reduce clutter):
where is a total monthly holding period return (capital gain plus dividend yield) on a bank's stock for period t, ( − ) is a market risk premium factor, is a monthly change in a given interest rate (we used the following alternative measures of interest rate: Treasury 1 year, Treasury 7 years, LIBOR 3 months, LIBOR 1 year or swap rate 7 years), and SMB and HML are the standard Small-Minus-Big and High-MinusLow Fama French factors. 7 The estimates of the ′ -the bank's sensitivities to interest rate returns -serve as our estimates of the implied MMs.
We use rolling windows of 48 months each to compute the sensitivities according to a 'symmetric' algorithm, i.e., for each period (month) we estimate the above three-factor model using observations over 24 months before it and 24 months after it. We use this method to allow for the possibility that the 's change over time. Accordingly, for any period t, starting the month t = 25 we estimate the using information from both past observations during periods (t-1) to (t-24) and from future observations (t+1) to (t+24), and proceed this way up to the latest sample period.
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Our choice of monthly frequency reflects a balance between the pros and cons of this frequency compared to its alternatives. As opposed to more informative weekly and daily data, monthly data are less noisy and contain more economically relevant information. As opposed to quarterly data, monthly data ensure the sufficient number of observations needed to implement a moving beta procedure, even though they do not fit the quarterly accounting reporting frequency. 
The correlation between implied MMs and volume
While there is no perfect or unique measure of trading activity, turnover has several benefits over the alternatives (see Lo and Wang 2000 for a detailed discussion). Hence, we use the following metric. For each pair of month and bank we compute the monthly turnover as the sum of its daily turnovers (as in equation 1, we drop the bank subscript):
where V stands for monthly turnover, Vs stands for total turnover on a particular day , is the total number of the bank's stocks traded on all stock exchanges on day and ℎ is the total amount of common shares outstanding on day . Our measure of common shares outstanding is adjusted for ADR conversion ratio for foreign incorporated banks. To deal with positive skewness in turnover, we calculate its natural logarithm. Our primary measure of investor disagreement is thus the industry-adjusted turnover, G, defined by:
where V M is a monthly turnover in the banking industry obtained by summing up the daily turnovers of all the banks in our sample in a given month and log (. ) denotes natural logarithm. Throughout the paper we use log-log as our main specification, except for when we note otherwise. This specification is advantageous as it transforms and approximates even highly skewed variables to normal. 11 In the robustness check, we examine some of the implications of this formulation.
We run generalized least squares (GLS) regressions of the following form to estimate the relationship between our measures of industry -adjusted volume and the implied MMs 12 :
The are bank fixed effects, the | |'s are the absolute values of interest rate risk and denotes a vector of the following covariates:
• | | is an absolute value of the intercept estimated from Equation (1) • | | is an absolute value of an error term from Equation (1);
• log( ) is a logarithm of the opening monthly price;
• log( ) is a logarithm of capitalization computed by multiplying its opening price with the number of total shares outstanding on the first day of the month;
• log( ) is a dividend-to-price ratio;
• is standard deviation of daily returns;
• (1) is first order auto-covariance of daily returns;
• | | is an absolute value of CAPM beta from Equation (1);
• | | is an absolute value of SMB beta from Equation (1);
• | | is an absolute value of HML beta from Equation (1);
• is a vector of year dummies;
• is a vector of month dummies.
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In line with our hypothesis, 1 , the effect of interest rate sensitivity on volume is expected to have a positive sign.
14 We use bank capitalization as a proxy for visibility (Merton 1987 , Dahlquist and Robertsson 2001 , Chordia et al. 2007 . Larger firms have a more diverse ownership, which leads to more active trading (Merton 1987) . Additionally, institutional investors follow the Prudent Man Rule by investing more in larger capitalization firms (Badrinath et al.1989 , Del Guercio 1996 . Size is also positively correlated with a number of analysts following a bank (Chordia et al. 2007) , which stands for the larger mass of informed agents (Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1995) . Price levels are also related to stock visibility. They are inversely 13 Equation (4) related to brokerage commissions, and so brokers tend to advertise low-priced stock more actively in an attempt to increase brokerage revenues (Brennan and Hughes 1991 , Angel 1997 , Schultz 2000 .
The inclusion of alpha in our model is motivated by its link to the expected return from CAPM and APT models. It may also contain a liquidity premium as documented by a number of previous studies (see Mendelson 1986a, 1986b; Hu 1997) . It also captures the extent of heterogeneous information about the stock (Wang 1994 , He and Wang 1995 , Ferson and Lin 2014 . Similarly, absolute values of errors are included in the equation to control for the possibility that unobservable effects (for example losses from liquidity drains or fluctuation in other market risks such as oil prices) might have consequences for trading.
We include market beta in the controls of Equation (4) since in addition to measuring systematic risk it also proxies estimation uncertainty about fundamental value of a stock, thus potentially affecting trading volume Loewenstein 1988, Coles et al. 1995) . Absolute values of HML and SMB betas are included as controls since they may reflect a particular composition of the bank's balance sheets and risk structures. Dividend yield is positively related to abnormal returns in the extant empirical literature. For example, according to the so-called dividend-capture trades, investors acquire stock just before the exdividend date and then sell it shortly after the date.
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Standard deviation of daily returns is used as a proxy for uncertainty about fundamental values (Karpoff 1987 , Gallant et al. 1992 , Zhao and Wang 2003 , Yin 2010 . In particular, in periods of high uncertainty stock could be more frequently traded because of upward and downward trajectory reversals in the price movements (Karpoff 1987) . High volatility may also lead to higher rebalancing needs, and thus to higher turnover (Lo and Wang 2000) . On the other hand, high and negative daily stock return autocovariance is synonymous to larger effective bid-ask spread (Roll 1984) . 16 Consequently, we expect it to have a positive 15 See Lakonishok and Smidt (1986) , Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) , Karpoff and Walkling (1988, 1990) , Michaely (1991) , Stickel (1991) , Michaely and Murgia (1995) , Michaely and Vila (1995 ), and Lynch-Koski (1996 . 16 The effect on turnover. We control for possible seasonality in turnover by using month and year dummy variables.
Finally, bank effects are used to capture the 'normal' level of trading in the bank's stock.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Descriptive statistics
Panel A of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of all returns used to estimate the coefficients of Equation (1). Note that, among all non-equity returns, 1-year Treasury bond return has the lowest volatility, and 3-month LIBOR return exhibits the highest volatility. Accordingly, 3-month LIBOR produced the largest (47.14%) and the smallest returns (-43.85%) in the sample. Also note that all returns are clustered around zero, indicating that investments in financial instruments, despite having different levels of riskiness, did not produce risk premiums over the sample horizon.
Panel B of Table 1 presents the correlation matrix of the return variables on the RHS of Equation (1).
One may note that for both the Spearman and the Pearson correlations of market returns are highly negatively correlated with Treasuries returns. This result is not surprising, given that increases in risk free federal fund rates are commonly associated with worsened economic conditions. Another interesting correlation is between LIBORs and swap rates. The co-movement of those time-series is clear if we think of the long-term swap rate as an expected future cash flow from the investment under the floating short-term LIBORs. Table 2 presents summary statistics of all the non-return variables on the RHS of Equation (1). Given that the sample consists of banks listed on global stock exchanges, their average market value is quite high and constitutes $1.88 billion, with standard deviation of $10.4 billion. The average number of shares outstanding is 82.33 million, whereas the mean turnover is 0.06, which is very similar to those reported in prior studies. 17 Additionally, note that the prices' and dividends' distributions are highly positively skewed (5.95 and 2.52, respectively). Our sample is comprised of securities with share prices ranging from as low as $0.1 to $504.7, with a mean of $17.1. The total annual cash dividend paid varies from $0 to $10 per share, with a mean of $0.8. As a matter of fact, similar to turnover, the natural logarithm transformation of those variables will be used to approximate their distributions close to normal.
First stage estimation: estimating implied MMs
Before we can assess the effect of MMs on investor disagreement, we estimate implied MMs with rolling window procedure, as described by Equation (1). Table 3 presents the coefficients of interest as well as auxiliary parameters recovered from such estimation. Note that the distributions' means of the interest rate betas are clustered around zero with approximately symmetric tails, implying that on average banks in the sample did not play the role of maturity transformers (e.g., issuers of long-term loans and holders of short-term deposits). The table also indicates that, while interest rates represent no price factors, CAPM beta, HML beta and SMB beta are all highly positive, indicating that bank portfolios tend to co-move with the market, value and small-cap stocks. The co-movement of banking sector with small-cap stock returns is not surprising, given the reliance of small firms on bank financing (as opposed to large firms with more diversified sources of funding). The correlation of this sector with value stocks can be explained by banks' conservativeness.
One may also observe that the average of the interest beta estimates of the 1-year Treasury rate (1.993)
is larger than that of the 7-year rate (0.193), as well as more dispersed. This feature is consistent with previous studies showing that shorter maturity Treasury rates have a higher absolute value effect on stock returns and embody larger variation (e.g., Flannery and James 1984 , Choi et al. 1992 , Song 1994 the financial instruments of shorter maturities being more frequently repriced, and therefore posing a source of short-term shocks to the banks' returns.
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Second stage estimation: the effects of MMs on volume
Based on the time-series of implied MMs for each bank in the sample, obtained in stage 1, we next test our hypothesis that increases in implied MMs increase investor disagreement. Table 5 presents the results of GLS estimation of the relationship between our measures of industry-adjusted volume and the implied MMs as presented in Equation (4). These estimates are made for the five alternative interest returns: 3-month LIBOR, 1-year LIBOR, 1-year Treasury, 7-year Treasury and 7-year swap rate. We use two models, labelled (a) and (b), for each class of interest rates. In both models the dependent variable is the logarithm of the bank's industry-adjusted turnover.
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Model (a) is our base model, which controls for the following variables: absolute value of interest beta, absolute value of CAPM beta, absolute value of market-to-book beta (SMB), absolute value of size beta (HML), opening stock price, dividend yield, bank size (market capitalization), and firm and time fixed effects. To reduce the chance of bias due to omitted variables model (b) adds the following controls: return volatility, daily returns' auto-covariance (a proxy for effective bid-ask spread suggested by Roll 1984), absolute value of Jensen's alpha (as a proxy for abnormal returns), and the absolute value of the disturbance terms (εit) from Equation (1) which stand for unexpected returns.
Table 4 presents a correlation matrix of the actual beta estimates from Equation (1). The lower triangle exhibits Pearson correlations and the upper triangle exhibits Spearman rank correlations. Note that the interest betas estimated on treasuries with maturities of 1 year and 7 years have the highest correlations in the sample (with 73.0% and 60.7% for Spearman and Pearson correlations, respectively), stressing on the co-movement of the banks' exposure to the risk-free bonds of different maturities. Similarly, interest betas for LIBOR rates are highly positively correlated with each other, possibly indicating that if a bank is active in the LIBOR market than it is simultaneously exposed to a movement in a number of LIBOR maturities. Correlations among other interest betas are lower and sometimes even negative. For example, the interest beta from the swap rates is highly negatively correlated with both interest betas estimated on the treasuries. Their Spearman correlations are -46.08% for 1-year treasuries and -67.15% for 7-year treasuries. This may be explained by the swap positions of the banks, e.g. banks that take a fixed side of the swap rate payers become counterparties to the floating treasuries-rate payers. Such a correlation matrix of implied MMs will let us comparing if there are potentially different responses of investors to different types of exposures 20 Petersen (2009) argues that clustering by bank and using time effects is optimal for having unbiased standard errors in wide panels characterized by a large number of banks and a small number of time points. White's (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by bank are reported in brackets and all data are winsorized at 0.5%.For the sake of simplicity, the tables do not report the regressions' intercepts.
First note that in Table 5 all the estimates of the coefficients of the interest rate betas, i.e., the implied MMs, are significantly positive indicating that larger implied MMs induce higher turnover. The implied MM range from 0.0116 to 0.0369, implying that a 1% change in stock return sensitivity to interest returns entails an increase of 0.012% to 0.037% in turnover. We note that the introduction of more variables lowers the estimated coefficients at implied MMs (as we move from a model (a) to (b)), but they remain significant and roughly of the same magnitude. The R 2 's of all the models are around 80%, indicating a very good fit.
Interestingly, as the coefficients values indicate, the magnitude of the effect of market beta on turnover is either insignificantly different from zero (as in specifications with swap and Treasury returns) or significant and negative (as in specifications with LIBOR returns), thus strongly refuting the argument in favour of the two-fund separation theorem (see Lo and Wang 2000) . 21 At the same time the betas of the market-to-book (HML) and size (SMB) factors are generally significant and positive in all models, with the coefficients at HML beta being generally higher than the corresponding coefficients at the interest beta. The positive effect of SMB betas can be partially explained by the higher disagreement on the chances of small firms to not repay their loans. The positive effect of HML may stem from higher disagreement on the merits of value stocks relative to growth stocks. Table 5 reveals that for both models (a) and (b) price, capitalization and dividend yield are highly significant (at 1% level or lower) and have the expected effects on turnover, thus explicitly describing the liquidity characteristics of equity. Additionally, the idiosyncratic risk and the absolute values of the alphas are significantly positively related to turnover, stressing that both expected and unexpected components of returns are incorporated into equity trading. Finally, as expected, return volatility and auto-covariance are found to be increasing with turnover, but their corresponding coefficients are statistically insignificant. Lo and Wang (2000) that market beta (and CAPM beta) is positively related to turnover. But adding HML and SMB factors to the model suppresses its positive effect on turnover.
In alternative specifications (market model and CAPM) we confirm the finding of
MMs and returns
In this part of the paper we examine whether the detected positive relationship between turnover and the implied MMs can be attributed to the effect of MMs on contemporaneous absolute values of returns, which in turn affect trading volume. For that purpose, we add the variables absolute 'marginal interest returns'
(a product of interest rate beta and change in interest rate) as controls to all the specifications of Table 5 . We hypothesize that, after controlling for marginal returns, the coefficients 1 remain significantly positive, thus indicating that the expected price effects of interest risk subsume little or naught from the effects of MMs on volume.
The results of models (a) and (b), which include the marginal returns, are presented in Table 6 . One observes that in all the models the coefficients of the MMs are positive and highly significant, while the coefficients of the marginal returns are not; in various specifications they are not significantly different from zero, in others they are sometimes negative and sometimes positive. That is, the results reported above confirm our hypothesis that the MMs affect turnover beyond their expected effect on returns, and consequently we infer that they affect disagreement among investors. Investors, cautious about MMs in banks incorporate interest risks in their investments decisions. The information that different investors possess, possibly extracted through different channels, apparently is heterogeneous and hence induces disagreement, but this heterogeneity does not affect prices.
Implied MMs and investor disagreement: robustness tests
We next present further tests to rule out the possibility that the effect of MMs on trading stems from their effects on returns. We employ Kandel and Pearson's (1995) methodology of testing for turnover differences between non-event (smallest or no MMs) and event samples (largest MM). Thus, we classify the sample into deciles according to actual returns and absolute MMs. Within each return decile, we test for the difference in mean turnover between the smallest and the largest MM deciles (applying t-tests). In line with our expectation that MMs increase investor disagreement, we anticipate mean turnover to be consistently higher for larger MMs across all return deciles and in particular in the decile with zero return. Table 7 presents the results of some of these tests. In Panel A we present the full statistics for one class of MMs, the 1-year Treasury interest rates. One may observe that within each return decile, the largest MMs sample yields consistently higher mean turnover, and the difference in mean turnover between the largest MMs and the smallest or no MMs is highly statistically significant (p < 0.0001). This result implies that even when there is no (or negligible) change in price, the mean turnover in the largest MMs sample is significantly higher than in the smallest or no MMs. This reinforces our claim that investor disagreement rather than returns is a key explanation for the observed patterns in the data. The same conclusions are gleaned from Panel B of Table 7 which repeats the above analysis for the other four classes of interest rates.
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Robustness tests were also conducted by running regressions (employing GLS procedure) of alternative specifications of Equation (4), alternative betas estimation procedures and alternative definitions of investor disagreement based on the dispersion of analyst forecasts. 23 The results are presented in the six panels of Table 8 (for brevity we 
CONCLUSION
In classical financial theory the exposure of a firm's return to interest rate risk is constant, and therefore it does not affect pricing. This, however, is not the case for financial institutions whose day-to-day decision making implies time varying shifts in the composition of interest rate risks, which reveal themselves through the existent maturity mismatches (MMs). In this paper we argue that, being positively correlated with opacity and complexity of portfolio compositions of the banks, MMs exacerbate uncertainty and ambiguity about the banks' performance and, as a result, provide more grounds for investor disagreement.
On the other hand, evaluation of MMs based on financial reports entails serious deficiencies, since such reports do not contain adequate information for flawless computation of MMs (think extensive off-balance sheet positions, basis risk, prepayment of loans, etc.). To circumvent this problem, we use implied MMs measured as stock return sensitivities to changes in interest rates. By means of regression analysis, we found a significant positive relationship between the implied MMs and their stock turnover, even in the absence of price changes. This effect is preserved in a number of specifications, after controlling for contemporaneous returns and standard determinants of trading volume.
Our paper still leaves some avenues for future research. First, even though we have shown that investor disagreement increases with implied MMs, it has not been shown how this phenomenon occurs.
An increase in trading can be attributed to one or more theories of investor disagreement (e.g., gradual information flow, limited attention, overconfidence and heterogeneous priors); identifying the precise These interesting questions however are a task beyond the space of this paper and are left for future research. (1) for the period from January 2000 to December 2012. Shares outstanding is the total shares outstanding as indicated on the balance sheet adjusted for stock splits and ADR conversion ratio in a given month. Trading volume is the sum of daily volume of a stock traded on all stock exchanges in a given month. Monthly turnover is the sum of daily turnover which is defined as the ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding on a given day. Capitalization is computed as a product of shares outstanding and opening price on the first day of a given month. Price is the opening monthly price in a given month. Dividend is a total per share dividend distribution over the last calendar year. Volatility is a standard deviation of a daily stock return in a given month. Autocovariance is first order autocovariance in daily returns in a given month. Dispersion of earnings per share (EPS) forecasts is standard deviation of analysts' long term (12 months ahead) EPS forecasts. Mean EPS forecast is a simple average of analysts' EPS forecasts. Number of analysts is the number of analysts based on whom the mean EPS forecast is computed. All the data are presented before winsorization. (1): interest betas, CAPM betas, SMB betas, HML betas and intercept terms. The column "equation" specifies interest rate used for estimation of the equation (1). All the data are presented before winsorization. generalized least squares (GLS) estimation of turnover on betas and controls. Marginal returns are ab betas and their corresponding risk factors, e.g. HML marginal return is absolute value of multiplication of HML beta and yed firm specific controls in basic model (a) are price, capitalization and dividend yield. Not displayed firm specific controls italization, dividend yield, volatility, autocovariance, alpha and residuals. White's (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standar ackets. Time effects are month and year dummies. All the data are winsorized at 0.5%. Constant is included into regressions b ake of economy of space. Stars denote significance: *** <0.01 **<0.05 *<0.1 turnover across return and MM deciles. In panel A, interest betas used to form deciles are recovered from the specification with 1 year Treasury bond. P-values are reported from the two-tailed t-test applied to test the significance of difference in mean turnover between the smallest and the largest MM deciles within each return decile. In panel B, interest beta used to form deciles are recovered from all other specifications except for 1 year Treasury bond. when the CAPM model is used to compute betas. Panel B presents results when the market model is used to compute betas. Panel C presents results of the log-linear specification where, for ease the sake of comparison of the coefficients, all betas are normalized by their corresponding standard errors. Panel D shows the output of loglog specification where estimation is conducted only on rolling windows having 48 months each. Panel E presents the output of the model in which the log of standard deviation of analyst EPS forecasts normalized by opening price is used as a dependent variable. Panel F presents the output of the model in which log of standard deviation of analyst EPS forecasts normalized by absolute value of mean EPS forecast is used as a dependent variable. Panel A uses CAPM
